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Chapter 52 part 1 – The Ootori Group (Corporate Group) (1)

On March 26, 1927, Japan’s financial world was rocked by a major shock.

This was because the Ootori Zaibatsu, using its abundant financial resources, completely absorbed the Suzuki Shouten, which was practically bankrupt, and expanded dramatically—placing at its top a new kind of bank called Ootori FHC, a form that people of the time didn’t quite understand.

Precisely because it was such an unfamiliar structure, the shock was even greater.

However, people adapt.
From then on, Ootori’s core institutional bank came to be called Ootori Holdings, while the zaibatsu side came to be known as the Ootori Group.

The kanji-heavy names that had been so carefully prepared—“Ootori Financial Holding Company” and “Ootori Corporate Group”—ended up being used only as official titles. The Japanese love for foreign words hasn’t changed, neither then nor now.

That said, since many people didn’t think too deeply about the meaning of foreign words, quite a few assumed “Holdings” was just another name for a bank.

Well, “close enough” is probably fine.

More troublesome than the general public, though, were the other zaibatsu.

While discussions had been held with Mitsubishi and a few other closely related zaibatsu, no contact had been made with long-time rivals like Mitsui and Sumitomo, the old merchant houses dating back to the Edo period.

Thanks to the efforts not so much of the Tanaka Giichi administration but of Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, we managed to avoid a direct hit. But Mitsui, for example, had been lying in wait like a vulture, expecting Suzuki to collapse—only for Ootori to swoop in and snatch everything up. 

Naturally, they’re furious.

There’s even a joke going around that it wasn’t Ootori (phoenix) but a tobi (kite) that stole everything. If this were the late 20th century, they’d probably be calling us a “vulture fund.”

But it’s not like we—or Suzuki, for that matter—haven’t thought about how to deal with the other zaibatsu.

Thinking ahead for future business, we’ve been selling off parts of Suzuki Zaibatsu bit by bit. You could even say that’s why we managed to reach an agreement with Mitsubishi.

However, Kaneko-san absolutely refused to deal with Mitsui—he insisted, “Anyone but Mitsui.” So we left all negotiations with Mitsui entirely in Kaneko-san’s hands.

Mitsui, irritated, even came storming directly to us in protest, but we told them Kaneko-san was the contact point and that if they went through us, we’d charge a referral fee—essentially driving them away.

The fact that they didn’t act on Ootori’s statements probably means that, despite everything, they didn’t think it was worth taking a major loss to acquire Suzuki’s companies.

As for Taiwan Bank, when we told them Ootori would gradually take over Suzuki’s loans, they were honestly relieved. Much of the financing they’d extended to Suzuki had already effectively gone sour, so in that sense, their reaction is understandable.

Besides, there are probably various other dangerous situations beyond just Suzuki. Even without counting Suzuki, there were still 30 million yen worth of earthquake bills left unprocessed.
However, due to the issue of being bullied by Mitsui in our dealings, we were pressured on that point, so we had to sweeten the deal in the buyout.

Also, no one is going to sell off companies that are performing well on their own, so many zaibatsu pulled out when their expectations were disappointed.
Furthermore, one reason the scavenger-move zaibatsu avoided the acquisitions was the partial public offering of shares, justified by performance expansion and restructuring.
In Japan’s business world of this era, where holding companies are the norm, they disliked the hassle and uncertainty of general shareholders.
That said, many zaibatsu are also buying shares of promising companies increasing their capital, from the position of general shareholders, so all I can say is, “They’re all quite shrewd.”

On another front, since the “Showa Financial Crisis”—which only I and a few family members know about—has yet to occur, the formation of the “mega-zaibatsu” I know from my previous life’s history has been at least delayed.
Even so, as seen in Suzuki’s de facto collapse, the post-World War depression and the post-earthquake recession have led to repeated bankruptcies and mergers of banks and companies, and there’s no fundamental way to stop this.
So, the trend of consolidation into large-scale zaibatsu and major corporations continues.

Eventually, it will come to be called one of the “three great zaibatsu.”
And Ootori, by swallowing up Suzuki Shoten—just before it slipped off the ranks of giant zaibatsu—with the enormous profits from American stocks, instantly transformed from a mediocre mid-tier zaibatsu into a massive one.
This caused a shockwave in Japan’s business world and triggered a reorganization of the business community not sparked by a crisis, specifically creating a trend toward concentration into large zaibatsu.
Each major zaibatsu actively pursued mergers and acquisitions of banks and companies to strengthen their financial power.

Before the war, unlike the 21st century, there were not even megabanks or city banks. Aside from the institutional banks of the large zaibatsu, there were mainly numbered banks and numerous small- and medium-sized banks. Many towns and regions had only one bank. There were few large banks with branches across Japan.

That’s why in 1926, there were as many as 1,420 banks.

In this world, by 1933, that number was cut by more than half, down to 650 banks. If the Showa Financial Crisis had occurred, the number would have decreased by at least another 100 banks. In fact, in the history of my previous life, it did decrease to roughly that extent.

Meanwhile, the total amount of deposits in Japan as a whole is about 9 billion yen. About one-quarter of this is concentrated—slightly later than in my previous life’s history—in the five major banks called Mitsui, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, Yasuda, and Daiichi.

Even without a financial crisis, the large zaibatsu were already enormous.

However, into this mix comes the maverick called Ootori Holdings.

What makes Ootori an outlier is that it consolidates financial companies into one entity, and its strength lies not in total deposits but in its massive equity capital. Above the banks, there exists an investment bank with a huge potential financial power that is far larger in substance.
This investment bank, called “Ootori Investment Fund Phoenix Fund Investment (PFI),” is purely funded by the Ootori family’s own assets, making it the property of the Ootori family rather than a zaibatsu or company. The effective ruler, according to an agreement set by my great-grandfather, is only the eldest son of the Ootori family.

At present, that means my great-grandfather, my grandfather (my father), and me.

Moreover, my great-grandfather is already retired and fully committed to preparing for the end of life, as if his work is done.
My grandfather, as head of the family, might have a role, but he has no intention of actively involving himself in running the zaibatsu or making money.

That means there is no one else but me.